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ABSTRACT
CLUSTER-BASED WIRELESS MOBILE AD-HOC NETWORK SECURITY
by
Mandur Bajra Bajracharya

A wireless ad-hoc network is a cooperative communication network deployed with a
specific purpose. It is characterized by dynamically changing topology with no fixed
infrastructure which exhibits a perfectly vulnerable state for a number of different kinds
of attacks.
This thesis proposes a novel technique of achieving security in wireless mobile ad
hoc networks by integrating a simple clustering and a voting mechanism together. The
purpose of forming a cluster is to facilitate security in the network and the voting is
performed to support the decision making process in the cluster. A procedure of forming
small homogenous clusters throughout the network has been proposed and used to
suggest different ways of intrusion detection and response. An effort has been made to
show how these nodes can be dynamically grouped into clusters by using only the MAC
layer.
The fundamental premise of the proposed security scheme is based on the policy
"do not let neighbors cheat". Other key issues addressed in the thesis are managing the
cluster, assessing performance of cluster members by performing comparative analysis of
recorded statistics with the pre-existing values, and voting to decide the action required to
be taken to keep the network safe.
Cluster based security is obtained in wireless ad hoc networks by employing a
distributed Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Each of the mobile nodes 'listens' to the

traffic constantly and collects local data to form a table. Since no cluster heads are
maintained in a cluster, whenever a node detects an anomaly in the network, it consults its
cluster members and derives a decisive response. Consultation is done primarily by a
voting process. Each of the cluster members vote on the basis of statistics they have
collected in their local statistics table. Majority voting is accepted and action is taken
under the predefined law. Similarly, when a node experiences pressure because of
network traffic or other network activities, it asks for assistance from its cluster members,
and assistance is provided as per directives given to each node.
OPNET, a network simulation tool, has been used to simulate the formation of a
cluster and measure the time required under various conditions.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

It is easier to deploy wireless communication network than conventional wired networks.
They provide seamless connectivity giving unrestricted worker mobility within the
coverage area. With the increasing data transfer rate ever offered, there could be hardly
anyone who would be willing to be denied the comfort and ease delivered by the wireless
communication technology.
As the industry standards are maturing and the availability of lightweight wireless
networking hardware is growing, wireless local area networks are being rapidly deployed
in industrial, commercial, and home networks. As different standards come into effect,
compatibility between different vendors is increasing, making the wireless devices more
affordable and readily available in the market [14]. As a result, use of wireless
communications is increasingly becoming pervasive in our daily lives.
Cellular networks are the earliest form of Wireless networks in which users are
connected using access points (base stations), and the backbone network. A user can
roam around through hand-offs between different access points. This kind of practice of
forming a wireless environment has been widely deployed and commercially used all
around the globe. The limitation of cellular network is its fixed topology of network at its
access point level, limiting the mobility of mobile nodes within the coverage area of its
access points. An ad hoc network overcomes this limitation and offers each mobile node
to act as a router, thus changing the topology rapidly and unpredictably. Besides, mobile
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nodes in such systems could be autonomous systems deployed on an ad hoc basis or
could be part of the global network connected to the larger Internet.
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are more vulnerable to attacks because of
their lack of a fixed infrastructure over the wireless environment. Owing to the
broadcasting nature of MANETs, it is extremely easy for any active node to access the
network. Any mobile node within the radio range of another node can always 'listen' to
what is being broadcasted, thus violating the privacy of the broadcasting node. It is also
easy for any malicious node to broadcast false information and disturb the operation of
the network. In view of this context, unlike wired networks, where monitoring and
ensuring of data integrity are done at higher layers of the network protocols (assuming
the lower layers are protected by wires for transferring data [4]), MANETs demand
security to be addressed at the datalink layer.
Another property of MANETs posing challenging threats to its security is its
constantly changing topology. The nodes in MANET are expected to join on the fly as
they move in and out of the network. There are no central certification authorities who
could perform an administrative task for certification of any of the nodes. Whenever a
new node joins the network, there is no way of knowing whether the node is malicious or
not. Again, unlike in the wired network, where an intruder could be a host inside or
outside the network, in MANETs, an intruder is necessarily a part of the network
infrastructure. Thus, it is even easier for an intruder to manipulate the message, and the
routing.
It is difficult to identify a malicious node in a network as long as it does not
perform any undesirable activity. It is only when these nodes start showing aberrant
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behavior that a malicious node can be detected, and immediate measures can be taken to
secure the network. There are basically three different ways of detecting malicious node
in a network as categorized by [15]. They are classified as anomaly detection, signature
detection and misuse detection. However, irrespective of how a malicious node is
detected, limitation of not being able to identify a malicious node in the very beginning
causes most MANETs operate in the mode "trust no peer" [1].
There has been a tremendous amount of research, in the field of security in ad hoc
networks. This includes developing a secure routing protocol, developing different
cryptographic methods to maintain the integrity of data, and developing different policies
for security. Yet, there still exist a number of areas which require further attention.

1.1 Research Objectives
This thesis aims at finding the solutions for various network security issues in mobile ad
hoc networks.
The first objective of this work is to explore the feasibility of forming a cluster
network to defend against security attacks. Clustered architecture has been used for
routing [16, 25], frequency and code distribution [16, 21], and to provide an individual
node a scaled down view of a network [16, 28]. Different from the above applications,
this research aims to form clusters to perform 'neighborhood based watch' [1], in which
each cluster member monitors the activity of the other cluster members. The second
objective of this thesis is to explore and propose possible solutions for different kinds of
attacks employing homogenous clusters.

4
1.2 Thesis Organization

This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses various attributes of ad hoc
network securities and taxonomy of attacks. It also provides a brief overview on a few
research works related to this thesis. In Chapter 3, detailed explanation of the proposed
`homogenous cluster' is presented. It also introduces the concepts and policies that are
used to form a cluster. Chapter 4 presents the explanation of information maintained by
each node and the intrusion recovery concept in details. It starts with the explanation of
information maintained by each node and finally encompasses the intrusion recovery
concept in details. Four different cases of attacks and possible solutions for them are
discussed to illustrate the possible use of homogenous cluster-based architecture for
intrusion detection and response. Chapter 5 presents the simulation model adopted in this
thesis. Chapter 6 presents the simulation results for different scenarios. Chapter 7
concludes this thesis and discusses the future research directions.

CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND PRIOR WORK

This chapter briefly describes the existing works in the field of security in ad hoc
networks. Section 2.1 describes different security attributes, and threats related to
wireless networks are discussed in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 surveys three research works,
which provide the useful technical background leading to this thesis.

2.1 Security Attributes
The following attributes help to classify different security needs in ad hoc networks [11].

Authentication: This term describes the need of recognizing users with the right identity
for data transmission. It is required to make sure that the network is not deceived by
malicious terminals, which provide false information or intercept data from genuine
users.

Availability: This term describes the need of presence of ad hoc terminals when they are
desired by other fellow terminals. It is required to make sure that the network acts in a
cooperative fashion to achieve the total functionality.

Confidentiality: This term describes the need of confining information among end users.
It is important to make sure that information about the network is not exposed to
malicious terminals. This goal is usually achieved by a cryptographic technique.
By using these attributes, each node in an ad hoc network needs to possess the
following characteristics for complete security [11, 19].
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Byzantine robustness: Being able to perform properly even when the network is under
attack.
Certainty of discovery: Making sure that the presence of a node is correctly detected.
Integrity: Maintaining certainty that the data transmitted/received are not tampered.
Isolation: Being able to isolate malicious nodes from good ones.
Lightweight computations: Having tasks with low computational complexity to perform
any operation.
Location privacy: Making sure that locations of nodes are not exposed to malicious
nodes.
Non-Repudiation: Making sure that nodes in the network do not deny services requested
to them.
Self-stabilization: Being able to recover from an attack after a certain amount of time.

2.2

Threats and Attacks

In wireless networks, an attack can be targeted at either the performance of the network
or the data in the packets. If an attack is made to the network, it can bring down the
performance of the whole network by damaging its throughput and efficiency. If an
attack is made to the data packets, it can harm an individual node and its performance.
Moreover, it is easier to launch an attack on wireless ad hoc networks because they are
deployed in public places where threats of eavesdropping are prominent. Attacks are
categorized as active or passive depending upon whether the attacker only 'listens' to the
network activity or takes part in network traffic by actively broadcasting packets. A
passive attacker silently listens to the data packets, and analyzes them to find network
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topologies or crypto-graphical keys. The following are different kinds of attacks that can
occur in ad hoc wireless networks [12].
Routing Loop: In this attack, an attacker broadcasts false routing routes to induce a

routing loop. This consumes network resources and results in degraded network
performance.
Black Hole: In this attack, the attacker either becomes a black hole by directing packets

from different sources to itself and dropping them all, or directs all packets to a certain
node and makes it drop all the packets. This attack can decrease the throughput of the
network.
Partitioning: It is caused by attacking a single node that connects two set of nodes. The

attacker analyzes the network topology, and compromises the linking node to partition
the network.
Rushing Attack: This kind of attacks is made by forging the sequence number in routing

packets. The attacker broadcasts forged packets with a higher sequence number and the
source address of the victim node. When the destination node receives the genuine packet
with a lower sequence number, it drops those packets thinking they are duplicate packets.
This attack can hamper route discovery.

2.3 Literature Survey

This section briefly introduces three research works, which discuss various techniques of
intrusion detection and recovery in wireless ad hoc networks. This thesis is motivated by
these ideas, and has adopted some parts of them to build a novel architecture of an
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Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The following sections discuss only the essence of
these papers that is directly or indirectly related to this research.

2.3.1 Intrusion Detection Using Mobile Agents in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks [2]
This paper discusses a distributed intrusion detection system for ad hoc wireless
networks based on the mobile agent technology. The authors proposed a multi-sensor
intrusion detection system which employs cooperative intrusion detection. This design
has a modular IDS architecture and distributed intelligent mobile agents in a small
number of nodes to achieve an adequate degree of intrusion detection.
The agents are categorized as action agents, decision agents and monitoring
agents. Monitoring agents are further classified into packet monitoring sensors, user
activity sensors, and system-level sensors. These agents cooperatively monitor both the
network and the hosts, and take decision accordingly. For example, packet monitoring
sensors monitor packets in the network for any trace of attacks, and the host monitoring
sensors constantly look for any suspicious activities on the host node, such as unusual
process memory allocations, CPU activity, I/O activity and user operations (invalid login
attempts with a certain pattern, super-user actions, etc). Each sensor monitors either the
network or the host actively, and reports to the decision agent. Furthermore, they form a
cluster with a clusterhead that monitors every member in the cluster. The cluster heads
are formed by voting, and they are kept within either one hop or two hops distance
depending upon the depth of security required in the network.
In this design, the authors assumed that both the decision agent and the packet
monitoring agent are present in the same node. The decision agent works completely
based on evidence of anomalous activities gathered by each node from its local
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monitoring agents and the packet-monitoring sensors. The IDS was proposed to work as a
local anomaly detection model so that any thing that falls outside the preset profile is
classified as a possible intrusion.

2.3.2 Architecture of the Mobile Ad-hoc Network Security (MANS) System [1]
In this paper, authors proposed a Law-Governed fully decentralized scalable security
policy with the Local Collaborative Group function. It is assumed that the IDS is installed
in every node collecting local data from both the host node and neighboring nodes. The
data are then used to identify any malicious activities in the network.
The authors proposed to form a Local Collaborative Group with well defined laws
to be followed by each node in the neighborhood. In this work, each node is associated
with a "group" to cast votes among its neighbors, and it can pass "messages" to share
information.
The foundation of this scheme is a neighborhood-based 'watch', which is a
process of monitoring the neighbors either periodically or triggered by some events. All
nodes can simultaneously and independently derive conclusion of any security breach in
the network. By forming the local collaborative group, nodes perform majority voting
among members within the same group to derive conclusions about whether a node being
voted is compromised or not. If there is a tie, it is repeated again for a certain number of
times, after which the node is decided to be bad. Implementation of this policy derives
three different security levels: benign, suspicious and compromised. Finally, if a node is
found to be compromised, it is barred from the network by global declaration that the
node is malicious.

10
2.3.3 Intrusion Detection in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks [9]
In this paper, the authors proposed an architecture, in which IDS is installed in each node
so that each node can detect the signs of intrusion locally and independently. These signs
are analyzed and investigated in a broader range by neighboring nodes collaboratively.
The simplified version of IDS is conceptually structured into six pieces as shown in
Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 Architecture of IDS.

Here, a local data collection table gathers streams of real-time data from various
sources. These data are analyzed for any trace of attacks in each node with a certain
percentage of confidence by the local detection engine. If there is any warning of
malicious activities, it first triggers the local response. If the warnings remain
inconclusive, agents seek cooperative help by triggering cooperative detection engine.
Cooperative detection is done with the aid of other nodes in the network. Nodes are
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suggested to derive conclusions about the global intrusion detection by using majority
voting. Finally, secure communication is achieved by nodes performing global response
to the threat.

CHAPTER 3
HOMOGENOUS CLUSTERS

Homogenous clusters are the novel kind of clusters proposed in this thesis to address the
security issues in a wireless ad hoc network. A homogenous cluster, which does not have
a cluster head, consists of a group of nodes in the vicinity of one another (within one hop
distance). They form a logical bond with each other and share equal responsibilities to
keep the network secure.
This chapter begins with an introduction to the basic information that each node
must maintain in order to form a cluster. It then describes how a homogenous cluster is
formed in an ad hoc wireless network by using only the data extracted from the MAC
layer, independent of any higher layer routing protocols. Finally, it describes the process
of breaking a cluster with size greater than five into two clusters — each with a size less
than five.

3.1

Information Maintained by Each Node to Form a Cluster

Figure 3.1 shows the data — Cluster Maintenance Table and Precedence Queue list
maintained by each node to form a cluster.
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Figure 3.1 Cluster maintenance table and precedence queue list.
Cluster members: A homogenous cluster consists of a number of cluster members. The
cluster member field enlists the addresses of all the cluster members in the cluster.
Heuristically, a homogenous cluster is suggested to have three to five nodes at any given
time. Hence, each cluster member only needs to monitor a small number of nodes, and
this reduces the overhead of monitoring. Once a node becomes a member of the cluster, it
must maintain a specific set of information about all the other members in the cluster.
Permanent/Temporary: This field indicates whether the cluster membership is
permanent or temporary. A cluster member is designated as "permanent" if it falls within
the radio broadcast range of itself and as "temporary" otherwise. This field is required
mostly in the scenario when nodes are sparsely distributed or when they lie at the extreme
ends of the network as discussed in Section 3.2.2. This field can have two values - TRUE
or FALSE.
Node been verified/unverified: A new node is allowed to join the cluster as soon as the
cluster allows it to do so. Once it joins the cluster, each member verifies its neighboring
nodes. This field indicates whether verification of each cluster member has been
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completed. It could be used when weighted voting is adopted or an extensive security is
desired. This field has two values - TRUE or FALSE.
Precedence Queue: This field is required to give priority to nodes when more than one
node request for voting for the same reason. While forming the cluster, it gets filled on a
first-come-first-serve basis. Any new node joining the cluster is appended to the first
vacant position from the beginning of the list. The first position of this queue is called the
`notch' and it bears the highest priority. Precedence queue is a circular linked-list, and is
updated when the 'notch timer' expires. The notch timer is the time duration, for which
each member gets privilege of being the 'notch' in the precedence queue. Each member
gets an opportunity to become a 'notch' with the period as defined by the timer value in
the 'notch timer'. If any of the node member moves out of the cluster, the precedence
queue is updated so that all members in the precedence queue behind it advances one step
forward.

3.2

Voting Policy

The homogenous cluster follows a majority voting policy. Nodes in the cluster decide any
action to be taken by voting. Any node that detects an anomaly in the network can
request for a 'vote' from its cluster members. Each cluster member casts its vote by
referring to its own data. The member, who requests for the 'vote', collects the responses
from all other members and decides the result, which is derived by a majority voting.
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3.3

Forming a Cluster

3.3.1 Flow Diagram of Forming a Cluster
The procedure of forming a cluster is shown in Figure 3.3. Two different flow diagrams
are merged together by a dotted line.
The left portion of the diagram denotes the flow for a node that requests to join
the cluster, while the other portion shows the flow for the members of the cluster to
which a new node is asking permission for membership. For example, considering
Figure 3.3, the left side of the flow in Figure 3.2 is for node A, and the right side of the
flow is for one of the nodes in cluster X. Each cluster is kept very small in size so that
every cluster member only needs to actively monitor a minimum number of nodes around
itself.
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Figure 3.2 Flow diagram for forming a cluster.
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3.3.2 Illustration of Forming a Cluster
With reference to the flow diagram in Figure 3.2, a simple illustration of how a cluster is
formed is given in Figure 3.3..

Figure 3.3 New node joining the cluster.
Consider that a node A wants to join cluster X in Figure 3.3.
•

Node A broadcasts a request to become a member of cluster X.

•

One of the members in the cluster will respond to the request of node A by
requesting votes from other cluster members to let it join the cluster. The
initiation of the voting process could be done by any of the cluster members as
soon as they get the request. However, only the node which initiates the
voting process can collect the vote and take the decision as resulted by the
vote. If the node initiating the voting process leaves the cluster, the issue is
handled by the notch in the precedence queue.

•

If voting in cluster X permits, node A is granted membership and cluster X
(node initiating voting) sends precedence queue to node A. A simple criterion
for voting in this case is that if all the members in cluster X could 'hear' node
A and the total number of cluster members in the cluster does not exceed the
maximum limit, the cluster will vote for accepting Node A as a cluster
member.

•

Node A sends its one-hop member list to all members in the cluster, creates
the local data collection table, requests all the one-hop members for
verification, and waits for all the fields to get filled. This verification contains
history of the new node, if it is from the last cluster member. The last cluster
member sends the last recorded 'local data collection table' (explained in
Chapter 4, Section 4.2) of the respective node along with the verification.
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•

Once all the cluster members and the new node have exchanged one hop
member list, the new node is considered as a part of the cluster. The
verification process could be run whenever the network resources are free and
can even be completed when the cluster performs the 'ping' operation as
described in Chapter 4, Section 4.3.1.

•

When it receives reply from node A, each node in cluster X forms the local
data collection table and sends verification requests to its corresponding onehop members.

•

As each node receives complete verification from all the one-hop members of
node A, they are marked as verified.

•

In extreme cases, if the network is sparsely distributed and one or two of
nodes cannot form a cluster of three, then cluster may be formed so that not all
the members are at one-hop distance. In this situation, Permanent/Temporary
table is used to mark each other in the cluster table. If a node can hear another
node, it is marked as "permanent"; "temporary", otherwise.

•

Nodes have a tendency to keep the maximum "permanent" members and to
maintain stability. Each node uses this criterion while voting to break the
cluster.

•

Once the cluster is formed, nodes exchange beacons periodically to keep the
cluster informed about its presence.

3.4

Breaking the Cluster

When a new node approaches to join a cluster with five members already, a voting
procedure starts in the cluster to grant it a membership. Each node gives preference to
form the smallest possible cluster and votes accordingly. If the voting is successful, the
new node is granted a temporary membership and added to the end of the precedence
queue temporarily. When the precedence list consists of six members, a voting starts to
break the cluster into two clusters — one containing the first three members and the other
with the last three members of the precedence queue. Each node votes based on stability
and Permanent/ Temporary count. If there is a tie in voting, voting starts to break the
nd _3rd .. 4th and 5 th _ 6 th -1 S t
cluster between
2 members of the precedence queue. This
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process continues until the voting is successful. If voting is still unsuccessful for the fifth
time, the cluster breaks between the first three and last three members of the 'notch'
queue.

Figure 3.4 Non-overlapping cluster concept.

The homogenous clusters formed for security are non-overlapping. These clusters are
logical bonds among nodes, and one node can be a member of only one cluster at a given
time. Even when different nodes belonging to different clusters come together physically,
they remain distinct in their behavioral property as shown in Figure 3.4. Thus, a node will
be actively participating in different processes for only one cluster.

CHAPTER 4
INTRUSION DETECTION AND RESPONSE WITH HOMOGENOUS CLUSTERS

This chapter describes how various kinds of attacks can be handled by the homogenous
cluster based architecture. Wireless networks have always been vulnerable to attacks
because of their broadcasting nature. Section 4.1 provides an explanation of different
assumptions made for the homogenous cluster based architecture. Section 4.2 describes
various information required for the intrusion detection. In Section 4.3, intrusion detection
for a homogenous cluster is illustrated. A case study of intrusion detection and recovery is
presented in Section 4.4.

4.1 Assumptions in Homogenous Clusters
•

Nodes are bidirectional: Nodes are said to be bidirectional if they both receive
and transmit data. Since an ad hoc network relies largely on different cooperative
algorithms for routing [9], any node in the path from the source to the destination
has to relay data. Hence, nodes with unidirectional property are not acceptable.

•

IDS is installed in each node: Each of the nodes in the homogenous cluster
monitors its cluster members for their behaviors and triggers response accordingly.
This procedure requires IDS to be installed in every node.

•

Secured key communication is already available: This assumption is made to
ensure that the MAC layer data available to form a homogenous cluster are
accurate and true.
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•

Thresholds are pre-analyzed and set: To identify an attack, all nodes need a
predefined set of reference data to indicate normal behavior. These predefined data
are the threshold values.

•

Nodes listen to passive acknowledgements: A passive acknowledgement is a way
by which a node in a wireless network confirms the data transmitted by it has been
forwarded to its destination by its immediate neighbor. In an ad hoc network, data
travel hop by hop, i.e. if a destination lies beyond one's radio transmitting range,
some nodes lying between them will relay the data. For example, if node B lies
between node A and node C, node B will relay the data. In this process, when node
A sends data to node B, it immediately broadcasts it to node C. Node A listens to
node B's broadcast to C and ensures that its data have been relayed. This type of
listening is called a passive acknowledgement.

•

Nodes use omnidirectional antenna with equal power: This assumption is to
make sure that no nodes maliciously use directional antenna for attacks. Attacks by
using directional antenna in wireless ad hoc networks are a different field of
research that are beyond the scope of this thesis.

4.2 Information Maintained by Each Node for Handling Attacks
Figure 4.1 shows the database table that each node maintains to respond to an attack.
Assuming there are at the most five members in a cluster, each node maintains record for
five nodes. Therefore, five similar tables are shown in the figure. An explanation of each
field in the table follows.
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One-hop members (Addresses): This field contains the addresses of the immediate
neighboring nodes of each cluster. An immediate neighbor of a cluster member is defined
as a node that falls within the radio broadcasting range of each other. Depending upon the
density of nodes in a particular scenario, this field can have a varying number of entries
and it is updated by listening to the activities of each of the cluster members. For example,
if a cluster member transmits data to any node, that node is kept in record as its one hop
member. This table can be optimized by keeping records of only the most recent activities.
The parameter to define 'most recent' can be characterized by a timer.
Number of packets sent: This is a count of the number of packets sent to a particular
address. If this count increases beyond the threshold value for a certain amount of time,
the particular cluster member can be suspected of trying to flood the network.
Number of packets received: This is a count of the number of packets received from a
particular address to the cluster member. This value may not be very accurate as all cluster
members may not be able to 'hear' what all other cluster members have received.

Figure 4.1 Local data collection table.

4.3 IDS Concept for Homogenous Clusters
In a homogenous cluster, intrusion detection and response are classified in two different
categories: a node detects anomaly in other nodes, and a node experiences attacks from
other nodes.
First, if a node observes any malicious activities from any node, it confirms the
situation by gathering votes from cluster members. If the gathered votes indicate positive
towards anomaly, it sends a complaint to the cluster that possesses the misbehaving node.
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Upon receiving the complaint about its cluster member, the cluster will verify the
complaint and issue warning to the corresponding node if it is found guilty. If the node
continues the misbehavior, it will be banned from the network.
Second, if a node is experiencing an attack, it will ask for 'help' from its cluster
members. Upon receiving request for help, cluster members will verify its member's need
for help and act to support it.
In any situation, decision making is done cooperatively by voting only. Hence, no
individual node is allowed to manipulate the network behavior without consulting the
cluster members. For example, no nodes can send any decision making packets such as
packets indicating banning a node from a cluster without casting a vote. Any node not
following this rule is deemed malicious.
These concepts have been used to illustrate proposals for addressing different kinds
of attacks in Section 4.4.

4.4 Case Study
4.4.1 Case I: Finding Hiding Nodes
In a wireless ad hoc network, nodes have limited battery power. It is always in the best
interest of a node to save the battery life by contributing the least service to the network.
This is, however, not acceptable in an ad hoc network where existence of the whole
network depends upon the cooperative activities of every node. If there is a malicious node
that selfishly expects its own data packets to be carried by the rest of the nodes in the
network, and tries to hide when it is its own turn to contribute to the network by relaying
data packets of other nodes, it can be identified by implementing the homogenous cluster.
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Selfishly hiding nodes can be traced by implementing a slightly improvised way of
pinging. Figure 4.2 illustrates how a hidden node is identified.

Figure 4.2 Ping with TTL = 2.
Suppose that node A is suspicious about any hiding nodes in its one hop
neighborhood. It will simply send a ping request with TTL= 2. TTL is set to 2 so that it
will spread to all its neighboring clusters. In return, whoever gets the ping request has to
ping back with TTL=1. The node A will listen to all the pings sent by neighboring nodes
and identify its one hop neighbors. When a ping request is received, the entire cluster
member will make sure that the other members of its cluster also respond. If any of the
cluster members does not ping back, it will send a ping request to that particular node. If
the node still does not ping back, it is deemed malicious. For example, in Figure 4.2, if
node D does not ping back, node E and F will request it to ping. If it still does not ping
back, it is considered to be malicious. This pinging procedure can also be used to find one
hop members of nodes periodically.
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4.4.2 Case II: Stopping Flooding
Flooding can be controlled by a cluster with internal voting itself. If any node is sending
excessive data (beyond the threshold limit) to any other node, the cluster will give it a
warning. If it continues the misbehavior, it will be banned from the network. Any attempt
of radio jamming by any node can be solved only by physically removing the node from
the network.

4.4.3 Case III: Coping Black Hole Attack/ Curbing Packets Dropping
Assume there are three clusters ABCD, EFGH and IJKLM in the network as shown in
Figure 4.3. Consider that a node in cluster 1 (C) needs to transmit data to a node in cluster
3 (M) via a node in cluster 2 (E). The node C collects passive acknowledgements of its
data being relayed further from node E. If node C detects node E is not forwarding its data
packets, it will ask to vote to give warning to node E. The corresponding members in
cluster 1 will check the local collection table to verify how many packets have been
transferred to node E and possibly the number of packets transmitted to node C by E.
(Note that the number of packets received by node C may not be very accurate). Upon
request for warning, the cluster will vote to give warning, and a warning will be sent to
cluster 2 for node E. Once the warning has been sent, nodes in the cluster switch to the
mode that they actively monitor all packets sent by node C to E. Cluster members in
cluster 1 will make sure that node C is sending packets that are required to be relayed by
node E.
In cluster 2, nodes will check their local collection tables on how node E is
forwarding its packets to the denoted next hop. If E is found guilty, they will vote to warn
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node E. Even in cluster 2, cluster members will switch to the mode where they actively
monitor all packets from E checking whether it is forwarding packets or not.
Node C will again try to send packets to node M via E, and both the cluster 1 & 2
will monitor this activity. If node E does not correct itself and continue misbehaving,
cluster 1 will again send a complaint to cluster 2, and cluster 2 will permanently block
node E and redefine their routing tables if necessary.

Figure 4.3 Three cluster scenario.

4.4.4 Case IV: Checking DDoS Attack
DoS attack is carried out by flooding the resource so that the network cannot operate
correctly. Since the ad hoc network operates in a distributed manner, this cannot be done
by a single node. Any node trying to flood can easily be handled as mentioned in case I. If
a node can change the routing table of some nodes, it may be able to stage Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks on any of the nodes in the ad hoc network.
Consider that node M and node C in Figure 4.3 are compromised. Each of them
sends packets continuously to node E within the threshold limit of each other. But for node
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E, the rate of receiving packets from node C and M together exceeds its basic limit. In this
case, it will request its cluster members for help and put a check on nodes in cluster 3 and
1. Nodes in cluster 2 will verify node E's request and request cluster 3 and cluster 1 to
check node C and M, respectively. If node M and C have been relaying the packets, the
request for check will be relayed to the corresponding source. If the nodes C or M
themselves are the source, they can get a warning about ongoing malicious internal
activities in themselves. If a node cannot prove that it has been relaying the data or if it
cannot change its activities, it will be deemed malicious and proper action will be banned
from the network.

CHAPTER 5
SIMULATION MODELS OF HOMOGENOUS CLUSTERS

This chapter describes the simulation models that have been developed to test and
evaluate the homogenous cluster-based architecture in mobile ad hoc networks.

5.1

Introduction

The objective of this simulation study is to determine the network overhead of the
homogenous cluster-based architecture. All simulations have been performed using the
discrete event simulator OPNET Modelers version 7.0. OPNET is commonly used for
network simulations and provides a rich library of models for implementing wired and
wireless simulation scenarios [13]. Section 5.2 begins with a brief discussion of the
modeling and simulation methodology used in OPNET. Section 5.3 describes the design
and interface of the `security processor' used to create homogenous clusters. Sections 5.4
through 5.6 discuss different aspects of the `security processor', and Section 5.7
describes the modifications performed in some of the library modules of the OPNET to
suit the ' securityporcessor'.

5.2 Modeling Using OPNET
OPNET is a discrete event network simulator used both by the commercial and research
communities. It provides a comprehensive engineering system capable of simulating
large communication networks with detailed protocol modeling and performance
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analysis. It also provides a number of built in libraries for modeling wired as well as
wireless network scenarios [13].
Simulation models are organized in a hierarchy consisting of three main levels • The simulation network
• The node model
• The process model
5.2.1 The Simulation Network

This is the top level for the simulation of the network scenario. It defines the initial
topology of the network and the scale of the network. It also allows the configuration of
attributes of the nodes comprising the scenario.
5.2.2 The Node Model

This is the second level in the hierarchy and consists of an organized set of modules
describing the various functions of the node. The functionality of each of these modules
in the node model is described by their process state as described in the process model.
5.2.3 The Process Model

This is the lowest level in the hierarchy. They contain the finite state machines,
definitions of model functions, and a process interface that defines the parameters for
interfacing with other process models and configuring attributes. Finite state machine
models are implemented using Proto C, which is a discrete event library based on C
functions and OPNET kernel itself.

31
5.3 The Design and Interface of the security_porcessor'
The security_porcessor' has been designed from scratch in the OPNET to form and
operate homogenous clusters. This module works independently of any routing protocol
implemented in each node. The basic purpose of this module is to collect data from the
MAC layer and populate the 'Local data collection table' and the 'Cluster management
table' with the recently available values. These values are then monitored by threshold
detectors to detect any aberrant activities in the network.
In a homogenous cluster, each node is assumed to have a security processor that
communicates with a security processor of the neighboring nodes via its own security
packets. These security packets are encapsulated in the 802.11 MAC layer packets and
broadcasted so that all the cluster members can collect them. A conceptual view of intersecurity processor communication is shown in Figure 5.1. The details of the security
packet format can be found in Section 5.4.
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Figure 5.1 Intra-security-processor packet communication.

5.4

Security Packets

Security packets have been created using the OPNET Packet Format Editor. It has seven
different fields as shown in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2 Security packet format.
Each of these fields carries the following information.
Source_Address: This field carries the MAC address of the node that is broadcasting the
packet.
Destination_Address: This field carries the address of the node in question. For
example, if node A is asking vote concerning node B, Source_Address will have address
of A, and Destination_Address will have the address of B.
Type, Subtype, Extol, Ext2 : These fields collectively denote the kinds of issues for
which security packets have been broadcasted. These fields can be populated with new
kinds of issues in the course of development. A basic tree structure of the proposed field
value is given in Figure 5.3. In this thesis, only the values related to cluster formation
activities have been used. An example is given below to illustrate how these values are
used.

Figure 5.3 Packet type tree.
Example
If node A is requesting a vote complaining over packet flooding by node B, it will have
the following values for Type, Subtype, Extol, Ext2.
Type : Request
Subtype: Vote
Extol: Complain
Ext2: Packet Flooding.
Information: This field carries information present in 'local data collection' or 'cluster
maintenance table' as and when required.
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5.5 Node Model
The node model developed for this simulation is shown in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4 Node model of an ad hoc mobile unit with the security processor.
For this simulation, different modules such as wlan_mac, wlan_mac_intf, wlanrx
and wlan_tx have been adopted from OPNET's built-in library with some modifications.
The mobility generating module mobility_generator is adopted from a library developed
by NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) which is available for
download from their website [17]. It describes a general billiard mobility in which
positions of the nodes are changed periodically after a certain time. In order to program
the security processor, detailed studies of different modules provided by NIST have been
done. As a result, a few modeling and programming techniques are borrowed from their
modules.
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5.6 Process Model of Security Processor
The process model of the security processor is developed from scratch to simulate the
homogenous cluster. The process model (state machine) designed in the OPNET is
shown in Figure 5.5.

Figure 5.5 Process model of the security processor.

The functions carried out by each of these states are briefly explained as follows.
Inuit: This is the very initial state where all the state variables, voting table, 'local data
collection table', 'cluster maintenance table' and other event handles are initialized. This
state prepares a node to perform its job by supplying all the initial attributes.
Idle: This is the state where the process waits for any interrupts to occur. As the
processor encounters interrupts by various events, it is directed to one of the states
connected to it for processing. For example, if the processor gets instream interrupt'
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denoting arrivals of packets, control is directed to the packet_processor. As soon as the
function is completed, the control returns back to this state.
Packet_processor: This state handles all the incoming packets. It is the main state that
carries out most of the functions like deciding about vote, accepting vote, and taking
other decisions.
Cluster_adjuster: This state is triggered as soon as the node realizes that it has less than
two members in its 'cluster member' list. It can also be programmed to be triggered
periodically to find the one hop members by providing counts for the ping counter. This
state can request for ping, or broadcast request to become a member of a cluster.
Response_threshold: This state is triggered whenever a node discovers any threshold
has been reached. This state handles all threshold counts, and requests vote to cluster
members to verify its data. A node can request for only one type of vote at a time. Hence,
once it requests for a vote, it cannot request votes for other issues unless the previous
request has been resolved. The replied vote goes to the packet_processor, and decision is
taken in the same state.
Notch_change: This state bears the notch counter that expires periodically to change the
position of notch in the precedence queue.
Passive_update: This state is used for passive listening to fill 'local data collection
table'. This state has not been programmed and is left for future development.
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5.7

The Modifications Performed in the Built-in Library
of OPNET's 802.11 WLAN Module

This section describes the changes that are made in OPNET's 802.11 WLAN module to
interface the security processor.
wlan_mac module: In this module, changes are made such that it will collect data for all

its cluster members, i.e., if this module receives any packet destined to its cluster
member, it will update its cluster member table.
wlan_mac_intf module : In this module, input and output streams are directed towards

the security processor to get a free flow of security packets from the security processor.

CHAPTER 6
SIMULATION RESULTS

This section describes the results obtained by simulating the module described in Chapter
4. Section 6.1 describes the simulation variables. Section 6.2 describes the general
simulation procedure, and Section 6.3 explains different results in more details.

6.1

Simulation Variables

The different parameters used to produce the simulation results are provided in Table 6.1.
All these parameters are common for all the simulations.

6.2 Simulation Process

The simulation starts when all the required parameters are set. The process stops as soon
as the goal for the particular scenario is met. Once it is over, graphs are plotted for the
analysis of the results. The graphs typically show the number of packets collected by
each node in a certain time duration. Note that the packet counts are only the security
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packets that have been exchanged, and the count for MAC layer packets like RTS, CTS
or ACK packets is not shown.

6.3

Simulation Results

6.3.1 Scenario I: Initial Cluster Formation.

In this scenario, three nodes are turned ON at the same time. As soon as the simulation
starts, the nodes actively get in the act to form a homogenous cluster. The simulation
stops as soon as their cluster formation process is completed. The initial positions of the
nodes in the scenario are shown in Figure 6.1, and the results of the simulation are shown
in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.1 Initial positions of the nodes.

The packet counts seen at each node (Figure 6.2) are different because the node turns idle
as soon as it successfully becomes a member of the cluster. The six packets received by a
node to form a cluster can be justified as follows. First, each of the node broadcasts
packets to become a member of a cluster, and this accounts for two packets each node
`hears'. Whenever a node 'hears' request for membership and finds itself in need of a
membership, it immediately sends acceptance, and this accounts for two more packets a
node 'hears'. Finally, when a node is accepted as a member, it sends its basic
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`information' to all other nodes and this accounts for the final two packets. In Figure 6.2,
mobile_node_12' starts broadcasting its request first. The remaining nodes 'listen' the
request broadcasted by the node, and start counting the packets. Thus, the count for
received nodes starts for mobilenode10' and mobilenode9' earlier than that for
`mobile node 12'.

Figure 6.2 The total numbers of packets exchanged and the time taken to form an initial
cluster of 3.

6.3.2 Scenario II: New Node Joining Pre-existing Cluster
In this scenario, a new node joins a cluster of three nodes. The cluster is formed before
the simulation starts, and the new node is placed in the radio range of all the nodes in the
cluster. When the simulation begins, the new node asks for membership and the cluster
permits membership after voting. The simulation stops as soon as the new member
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successfully joins the cluster. The initial positions of the nodes are shown in Figure 6.3
and the simulation results are shown in Figure 6.4.

Figure 6.3 Initial positions of the nodes when the new_node' asks to join the cluster.
From Figure 6.4, it can seen that the new_node' starts broadcasting a request to
become a member of a cluster, successfully finishes the process in 0.03s, and becomes
idle after exchanging 11 packets. The members of the pre-existing cluster have to
exchange more packets because of the voting process. By the time the new_node'
exchanges 11 packets, the other nodes exchange 15 packets to arrive in the decision
process. They 'listen' to two more packets after 0.03s, because one of the packets is the
confirmation packet from the new_node' and the other one is the confirmation sent by
each of the nodes to the 'new node'.
Comparing scenario I and II, it can be seen that joining a pre-existing cluster takes
a longer time than forming a cluster initially. This is because scenario II involves the
voting procedure being carried out to arrive at the decision about forming a cluster.

43

Figure 6.4 The total number of packets exchanged and the time taken for new node to
join the cluster.

6.3.3 Scenario III: Detecting an Attack

In this scenario, a simple attack is detected in a cluster of three nodes. One of the nodes
constantly sends data packets at the rate of 1 packets. Other cluster members are
programmed to remove any node, which broadcasts more than 50 packets from cluster
member list after consultation. The simulation result shows how cluster members
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successfully stop counting any data packets as soon as they receive confirmation of the
attack. This scenario is used to test the viability of using homogenous cluster to detect
any attack. Figure 6.5 shows the initial positions of the nodes in the scenario. In Figure
6.6, packets received by a good node and a bad node before and after the attack are
shown. Figure 6.7 reproduces the graph in Figure 6.6 for a bad node with a different time
scale showing the exact time taken for the bad node to be ignored by other good nodes.

Figure 6.5 Initial positions of the nodes where mobile_node_6' is the bad node.
From Figure 6.6, it can bee seen that, as soon as the bad node (`mobile_node_6')
broadcasts the 50 th packet, the good nodes vote to confirm its activities. They exchange
three packets in voting, which is 'heard' by the bad node as seen in Figure 6.6. Once the
issue is confirmed, the good nodes stop accepting any packets from mobile_node_6',
and show the constant number of packets received in their count. When the time scale is
changed, it can be seen that it takes only 0.002s for the cluster to make the decision that
the bad node has reached the threshold of broadcasting 50 packets.

45

Figure 6.6 The number of packets received by a good node and a bad node in the attack

scenario.

Figure 6.7 The reproduction of graph in Figure 6.6 for a bad node with a different time

scale showing the exact time taken for the bad node to be ignored.

CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This chapter concludes the thesis by 1) summarizing the contributions, and 2) outlining
the future research directions.

7.1 Contributions
This thesis proposes a novel homogenous cluster to restrict attacks in wireless ad hoc
networks. Compared with other cluster-based schemes [16] [20] [21], this new proposal
is characterized by the following aspects. First, no cluster head is required in each cluster.
Second, inspired by the work in [6], 'precedence queue' is used to help load balancing
and distribute responsibilities among all cluster members. Third, the 'cluster management
table' is developed to support the homogenous clusters operation. Various fields in the
table are obtained heuristically.
Among many types of attacks in wireless networks [4] [5] [7] [11] [19] [23],
some basic attacks have been investigated in detail within the framework of the
homogenous cluster-based architecture.
As another goal of this thesis, simulations are carried out to find the feasibility of
forming a homogenous cluster for securing a wireless ad hoc network. A mobile node is
created with a 'security processor' in OPNET. This 'security processor' can interact with
other security processors in other nodes by using security packets. It is found that it takes
less than 0.05 second to form a homogenous cluster with less than 18 packets exchanged
among all nodes in the cluster at 1Mbps data rate for the given scenario. The delay is
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tolerable and the network overhead is acceptable for a network with moderate mobility
nodes.

7.2 Future Works
This thesis has created some future research opportunities. First, it is interesting to
investigate how to set the different performance matrices such as TTL duration and
notch_timer duration so that the system can achieve the optimal performance. Second, it
is important to study which voting strategies, weighted voting or majority voting, can
achieve better performance. Third, the likelihood of editing the 'cluster member table'
and 'local data collection table' with various other fields requires further study. Fourth, a
prospect of deriving different threshold values for triggering interrupt in the
security_processor based on QoS factors in the network can also be studied for finer
granularity. Fifth, more simulations for various attack scenarios need to be done to
evaluate the effectiveness of our intrusion detection and recovery scheme.

APPENDIX
THE IEEE 802.11 WIRELESS LAN STANDARDS

This appendix provides a brief introduction to IEEE 802.11.
IEEE 802.11 has defined a set of specifications for both physical and medium access
control layer of a network. The specifications allow three different kinds of technologies
for transmission of data between nodes, namely, frequency-hopping spread spectrum,
direct sequence spread spectrum, or infrared (IR) pulse position modulation.
The MAC layer uses CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision
Avoidance) for sharing the common wireless medium. CSMAICA is different from
CSMAICA (Collision Detection) which is used in Ethernet in the sense that a node
willing to transmit a packet does that only when it senses the channel is free. CSMAICD
cannot be implemented in wireless networks because a node cannot hear any other nodes
when it is transmitting because signals from other nodes will be overwhelmed by its own
signal [24].
Furthermore, 802.11 maintains the order of transmission by using short message
packets like RTS (Ready to send), CTS (Clear to send) and ACK (Acknowledgement).
Exchange of these messages is necessary in the wireless medium for collision avoidance
in hidden nodes. When two nodes are far apart and they cannot listen to each other, they
could transmit data any time when they think the channel is free. However, if there is a
node amid them and can listen both the far apart nodes, it will constantly experience
collision. This kind of problem is called the hidden node problem. Use of short messages
is done to avoid this problem.
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